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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4404 
___________ 
 
NATARAJAN VENKATARAM, 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 
JANICE GALLI MCLEOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-OFFICE OF 
INFORMATION POLICY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-06520) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 7, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 10, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Natarajan Venkataram, a federal inmate, has appealed the District 
Court’s orders granting summary judgment to the Government and denying his motion 
for reconsideration in this case arising under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 
U.S.C. § 552.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 In 2005, Venkataram and D.V.S. Raju were both charged with numerous counts 
concerning a conspiracy to defraud New York City.  According to the indictment, 
Venkataram laundered $6.2 million by sending it to one of Raju’s companies in India.  In 
December 2006, however, the Government dismissed the charges against Raju by entry 
of an order of nolle prosequi.  In October 2007, meanwhile, Venkataram pleaded guilty to 
all 16 counts of the indictment, and he was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.   
 In December 2008, Venkataram requested, through FOIA, that the Government 
provide him with all documents concerning its decision to dismiss the criminal charges 
against Raju.  The Government refused to turn over any documents, claiming that the 
records were categorically exempt from release under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).  
Venkataram filed a complaint in the District of New Jersey challenging the Government’s 
refusal to disclose those documents and, over the Government’s objection, the District 
Court remanded the case to the Department of Justice for a particularized analysis of the 
documents Venkataram requested. 
 Eventually, the Government produced 352 pages in full and one page in part, and 
withheld 165 pages in full and one in part.  The Government also provided an index in 
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which, for each withheld document, it described the document, listed the number of pages 
that were withheld, identified the statutory basis for the withholding, and provided a short 
argument in support of the decision to withhold.  Venkataram returned to the District 
Court, arguing that the Government had not made a sufficiently thorough search and had 
wrongly withheld documents that it should have produced.  The Government filed a 
motion for summary judgment, claiming that its search and decisions as to withholding 
were proper.  In a comprehensive 38-page opinion, the District Court granted the 
Government’s motion.  Venkataram filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District 
Court denied.  Venkataram then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We employ a two-tiered test in 
reviewing the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  First, we determine 
“whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for its determination”; if it did, 
we then assess “whether that determination was clearly erroneous.”  Abdelfattah v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  
Meanwhile, we review the order denying the motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Before this Court, Venkataram focuses entirely on the Government’s refusal to 
produce the four-page agreement it entered into with Raju in which it agreed to dismiss 
the criminal charges against him (“the Agreement”).  Venkataram argues, first, that the 
District Court should have required the Government to disclose the Agreement because 
the Government has “officially acknowledged” the existence of that document.  As the 
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D.C. Circuit has explained, “when an agency has officially acknowledged otherwise 
exempt information through prior disclosure, the agency has waived its right to claim an 
exemption with respect to that information.”  ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013).  However, this rule is narrow; for information to be officially disclosed, “(1) 
the information requested must be as specific as the information previously released; (2) 
the information requested must match the information previously disclosed; and (3) the 
information requested must already have been made public through an official and 
documented disclosure.”  Moore v. CIA, 666 F.3d 1330, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
 We agree with the District Court that Venkataram failed to establish that the 
information in the Agreement has been officially acknowledged.  See ACLU v. CIA, 710 
F.3d at 427 (noting that initial burden is on the plaintiff).  He argued in the District Court 
only that this document had been officially acknowledged, not that “the specific 
information” in the document had been acknowledged.  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 
F.3d 612, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).  While this argument could potentially 
overcome a Glomar response — where the Government “refuse[s] to confirm or deny the 
existence of records,” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) — it is not 
sufficient in a case like this one, where the Government acknowledges the record but 
argues that it is protected from disclosure.  See id. at 380.  Moreover, Venkataram has 
failed altogether to show that the specific information in the Agreement has been 
previously released.  See Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 11 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (agency does not waive exemptions “by publicly discussing the general subject 
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matter of documents which are otherwise properly exempt”); Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (plaintiff has “burden of showing that there 
is a permanent public record of the exact portions [of the information] he wishes”).1   
 Venkataram next argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
Government was permitted to withhold the Agreement pursuant to the exemption set 
forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7(C)”).  Under Exemption 7(C), an agency 
is not required to disclose records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes 
that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”  § 552(b)(7)(C). When the Government invokes Exemption 7(C), the court 
must “weigh[] the privacy interest and the extent to which it is invaded, on the one hand, 
against the public benefit that would result from disclosure, on the other.”  Ferri v. Bell, 
645 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1981).  
 The District Court did not err in weighing the factors here.  On the one hand, the 
criminal charges against Raju were dismissed, and he thus has a “fundamental interest” in 
                                              
1 Venkataram also contends that there was a dispute of fact concerning whether the 
Agreement was officially acknowledged, which should have precluded the entry of 
summary judgment.  We are not persuaded.  First, in FOIA cases, “the familiar standard 
of appellate review promulgated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) does not 
apply,” McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993), and the District 
Court is actually required to “make distinct decisions as to factual questions,” Summers 
v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  In any case, Venkataram has 
not actually raised a disputed issue of material fact; rather, he argues about the legal 
consequences of undisputed facts.  Even under the traditional summary-judgment 
standard, it is appropriate for the District Court to resolve this type of question.  See, e.g., 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee note (2010) (stating that court “must determine the 
legal consequences of these facts”). 
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limiting the disclosure of this information.  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 750 F.3d 927, 
935 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Meanwhile, the public benefit of the disclosure would be slight.  
Although Venkataram seems to believe that information about Raju’s agreement with the 
Government would reveal that the Government somehow acted improperly, he supports 
this claim with just his “bare suspicion,” which will not suffice to obtain disclosure.  
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).  Further, contrary 
to Venkataram’s contention, information about Raju’s nolle prosequi, representing just a 
single data point, will reveal little about the Government’s use of prosecutorial discretion.  
See Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in concluding that exemption 7(C) applies 
here.  See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 750 F.3d at 935 (so holding in similar 
circumstances). 
 Finally, Venkataram argues that the District Court erroneously relied on the 
exemption found in § 552(b)(5) — which covers, among other things, documents 
protected by work-product privilege — to deny his request for the disclosure of the 
Agreement.  He is mistaken; the Government sought to withhold the document solely 
based on Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and the District Court considered only those 
exemptions. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
